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MARITAL ACTS, MORALITY, AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
MARK STRASSER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, several courts have been forced to examine whether
the right to marry includes the right to marry a same-sex partner.' Most courts have
held that it does not,2 although two courts have recently suggested that same-sex
marriages may be constitutionally protected.3 These latter two decisions have
sparked much scholarly debate concerning the morality of same-sex unions and
whether such unions should be recognized by the state.
One approach to the issue that has received a great deal of attention suggests that
same-sex couples cannot engage in truly marital acts and thus should not be allowed
to marry. However, this approach has at least two difficulties. First, it relies on a
particular notion of marriage which itself is deeply contested, thereby undermining
the approach's persuasiveness. Second, and more important for purposes of this
article, this approach does not reflect the current legal understanding of the
functions and goals of marriage, especially considering the protections afforded by
the right to privacy. Thus, the approach simply does not provide arguments that are
persuasive in the context of a discussion about whether such unions should be
recognized by the state. Even were the approach's notion of marriage generally
accepted and even were it true that same-sex unions involved something morally
impermissible-a separate question would be whether such marriages should
therefore not be legally recognized. Surprisingly, the latter aspect of the
argument-what legal implications would exist, if any, if same-sex unions were in
fact morally impermissible, is too often either underdeveloped or simply ignored,
notwithstanding the centrality of this part of the argument if one's goal is to offer
a suggestion about what the state should do.
Part II of this article discusses which sexual acts can be marital, concluding that
current analyses are impoverished in their conception of what is intrinsically good
and, further, are either too vague or internally inconsistent in their assessments of
what counts as an act. Part III suggests that the analyses of marital acts offered by
certain theorists have been explicitly rejected by the state and that the purposes of
marriage as recognized by the state would in fact be promoted by recognizing same-
sex unions. The article concludes that the theories discussed which attempt to
establish the moral impermissibility of same-sex unions and the desirability (from
a public policy standpoint) of refusing to legally recognize such unions succeed on
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Professor of Law, Capital University
Law School.
1. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562C, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska
Super. Feb. 27, 1998); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980). aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.
1982); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971); Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974).
2. See, e.g., Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1124; Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186; Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500;
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197.
3. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *6; Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18
(Hawai'i Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
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neither count, because these theories are neither consistent in their own right nor
consistent with the implicit and explicit purposes of marriage that have been
recognized by the state.
11. SAME-SEX RELATIONS AS ESSENTIALLY NON-MARITAL
Some of the current natural law theorists offer subtly differing accounts of why
same-sex relations cannot be marital. Nonetheless, many theorists' views overlap
and tend to have a common goal, namely, suggesting that same-sex unions should
not be recognized by the state. However, these accounts are unconvincing, at least
in part, because the elements of the theories which do most of the work are, at best,
ad hoc, and, at worst, inconsistent with other elements of the theory. Ironically, an
examination of two current, slightly differing natural law attempts to illustrate why
same-sex relations cannot be marital reveals some of the fatal weaknesses of such
theories and further suggests why the state should seriously consider recognizing
such unions."
A. Marriage as Means and End
Professors Patrick Lee and Robert George offer one theory about why sexual
activity between individuals of the same sex cannot be marital. That theoiy is
predicated upon one of three differing views of marriage.5 Had these theorists
embraced either of the alternative views that they discuss, they would then have
been forced to admit either that same-sex relations may indeed be marital or that
some sexual relations between husband and wife, which are seen by many as
paradigmatically marital, are no more marital than are same-sex relations. Their
theory is ultimately unpersuasive, in part because their theory seems ad hoc and in
part because the implications of the theory are so counterintuitive.
According to the first view of marriage discussed by Professors Lee and George,
"marriage is essentially a contractual union, and its extrinsic purpose is the
conceiving and raising of children."6 Even according to this view, sexual relations
are not viewed "only as serving procreation,"7 but also "secondarily .. .as
symbolizing the marital friendship."' Nonetheless, "marriage is an institution which
is defined by its instrumental relation to procreation"9 and marriages that will not
result in children are not true marriages as the term is properly understood.
In contrast to this instrumentalist view of marriage, a different view holds that
"marriage is essentially a friendship, procreation is an extrinsic addition, and sexual
acts are extrinsic symbols or expressions of love or of the couple's personal
4. Here, the views of Professors Patrick Lee & Robert P. George as reflected in their What Sex Can Be:
Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. JuRIS. 135 (1997), will be examined. Professor John
Finnis' view as reflected in his Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 11 (1995) [hereinafter Finnis (1)], and his Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation, " in SAME SEX:
DEBATING THE ETHICS, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE OF HOMOSEXUALrY 31 (John Corvino, ed. 1997) [hereinafter
Finnis (2)], will also be examined.
5. See generally Lee & George, supra note 4, at 135.
6. Id. at 142.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. Id.
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communion. '' "° According to this view, "there is no intrinsic or essential
relationship between marriage and procreation."" Couples who do not plan to have
children might marry, and contracepted sex is morally permissible within marriage.
Indeed, Professors Lee and George suggest that according to this understanding of
marriage "there is no reason why 'marriage' should refer only to man-woman
relationships"" and there is no "morally significant difference between homosexual
and heterosexual relationships."' 3 Ironically, because this is the view of marriage
incorporated within the law, 4 these theorists would seem to be offering a
compelling reason for the state to recognize same-sex unions, although of course
these theorists subscribe neither to this view nor to the position that the state should
recognize such unions.
The third view of marriage involves a combination of the two views briefly
described above. The third view regards marriage as a community of two
individuals "who publicly consent to share their whole lives, in a type of
relationship oriented toward the begetting, nurturing, and educating of children
together."' 5 The "openness to procreation, as the community's natural fulfillment,
[is what] distinguishes this community from other types [of communities]."' 6
According to this view, sexual intercourse is appropriate within the marital setting
"because in such a community sexual intercourse can immediately actualize (initiate
or renew) the good of marriage."' 7 Here, marriage is viewed as an end in itself and,
in addition, as instrumental to procreation.
The third view of marriage, which Professors Lee and George propose is the
correct view,"s must be distinguished from the other two. Because on the third view
"marriage is good in itself,"' 9 the marriage of a childless couple "is fully a marriage
and remains good in itself,"' ° which might be difficult to maintain if marriage is
merely instrumental for the production and raising of children.2' However, a
childless marriage "lacks its complete natural fulfillment,"' contrary to what the
second view of marriage would suggest.23 Thus, the third view incorporates
elements from both of the other views and is not reducible to either.
Yet, what is less clear is that the third view incorporates elements that are in
neither of the first two, and that these additional elements largely define which acts
are marital and which are not. For example, while the third view suggests that
sexual relations between a sterile husband and wife can be marital, it does not
suggest the same about contracepted sexual relations between husband and wife.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 143.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 129-161 and accompanying text.
15. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 143.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
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According to Professor George and Lee, contracepted sexual relations are immoral
and no better than same-sex relations.' Thus, this view adopts neither the position
that acts are marital because they may result in children nor the position that acts
are marital because they communicate love and affection. Further, while this view
holds that some procreative sexual relations between husband and wife are marital,
it also holds that other consensual, procreative sexual relations between husband
and wife are not.2" It thus implies that some consensual, sexual relations between
husband and wife which others view as paradigmatically marital should nonetheless
not be viewed as marital at all.
To understand why this conception of marital acts has these surprising
implications, more about the theory must be understood. First of all, "engaging in
sex merely for pleasure is wrong,"' 6 even if the parties are married and
monogamous. Something in addition to or instead of pleasure must be sought and
"unless the sexual act embodies or actualizes a real union of persons, it will involve
the instrumentalization of both . . . person[s]."' Thus, for example, a married
couple having sexual relations for the sake of pleasure may not be engaging in a
"marital" act, even if that activity results in a child and even if each individual
would never dream of having sexual relations with anyone other than his or her
spouse.2"
These theorists make clear that "only in marriage can sexual acts constitute a real
union of persons[,]"29 but deny that all sexual acts between husband and wife will
pass the relevant test, even if the sexual act is not performed merely for pleasure.
For example, sodomitical acts performed by husband and wife are not morally
permissible, even if the husband and wife "intend their act as in some way an
expression of their love for each other."30
Some commentators go so far as to deny that sodomitical acts can involve
expressions of love. For example, Professor Finnis suggests that same-sex sexual
relations
cannot express or do more than is expressed or done if two strangers engage in
such activity to give each other pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures a client to give
him pleasure in return for money, or (say) a man masturbates to give himself
pleasure and a fantasy of more human relationships after a grueling day on the
assembly line.3'
This idea goes far beyond a claim about the morality of such acts and involves a
theory of expression which, at the very least, is unusual. If each of two same-sex
partners intended her sexual activity to communicate her love to her partner and if
24. But see infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text (explaining why only certain kinds of contraception
might be impermissible on this account).
25. See Lee & George, supra note 4, at 145 (suggesting that sexual acts between husband and wife are not
marital in the relevant sense if they "are extrinsic to the personal communion of the couple").
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 138-39.
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id. at 146.
31. Finis (1), supra note 4, at 29.
[Vol. 30
MARITAL ACTS, MORALITY, & RIGHT TO PRIVACY
each partner had understood the act as an expression of love, they allegedly would
nonetheless have expressed no more than two individuals having anonymous or paid
sex. Certainly, a common definition of "express" does not lead to this conclusion.32
While Professor Finnis disagrees with Professors Lee and George about whether
sodomitical acts can involve an expression of love, he agrees that such acts cannot
be marital because, when performing them, "the participants do not unite
biologically."33 Biological unity is only possible in reproductive activity, although
of course "not every act of coitus is reproductive."' After all, a fertile couple may
have sexual intercourse several times a week. Were conception to result, the
husband and wife would not know which of the acts caused conception.35
Nonetheless, all of these acts would have involved biological unity.36 Indeed, both
sex during pregnancy and sex after menopause would be procreative in the relevant
sense, because the difference would not be "a difference in what [the couples]
do-the kind of act-but in a condition extrinsic to what they do."'37 Thus,
biological unity is not dependent upon whether the couple engaging in the activity
can thereby produce a child. However, certain kinds of sexual relations do not
involve the requisite kind of biological unity and are morally impermissible, even
though those relations are no less likely to result in the birth of a child than are
some morally permissible relations.38
Professors Finnis, Lee, and George recognize that sodomitical relations might be
pleasurable. Nonetheless, "although each person may experience pleasure, they
experience pleasure each as an individual, not as a unit. ' 39 Yet, there are at least two
different senses in which one might be said to experience pleasure as an individual
rather than as part of some greater unit. In one sense, the individual feels distant and
psychologically separate from his partner and experiences pleasure as a distinct
being who only has a physical connection with the other person. For example,
suppose that John uses Susan to obtain pleasure for himself, but does not care that
it is Susan rather than someone else that allows him to have this pleasure.' Here,
he would be experiencing pleasure as an individual rather than as part of a greater
unit because he feels no emotional connection to Susan.
Suppose, instead, that it is central to John's pleasure that Susan is his partner and
his goal in having sexual relations is the production of her pleasure rather than his.4"
32. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 683 (2d ed. 1987) (defining
"express" as: "1. to put (thought) into words; utter or state: to express an idea clearly 2. to show, manifest or reveal:
to express one's anger. 3. to set forth the opinions, feelings, etc. of (oneself) as in speaking, writing, or painting").
Thus, the more accurate and persuasive response to Professor Pinnis is not that both sterile and same-sex couples
could not express more than is expressed when sex is exchanged for money, but that this is true of neither type of
couple. See Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J, JURIS. 51, 63-64 (1997).
33. Lee & George, supra note 4. at 146.
34. Id. at 144.
35. See id. at 150.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. For further analysis of this distinction, see infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text.
39. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 146.
40. See id. at 141.
41. See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis, 9 NOTRE
DAME J.L ETHIcS & PUB. POL'Y 41, 51 (1995) (discussing sexual conduct as "a way of affirming and serving both
the sexual and the emotional wellbeing of one's lover").
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He might feel as if his experiencing pleasure were part of their experiencing
pleasure. Here, he would feel a nonphysical connection to his partner and might feel
that he was experiencing pleasure as part of a greater unit. Of course, in yet a
different sense, John would experience pleasure individually regardless of whether
he felt an emotional connection to Susan, because he in fact is a separate individual
who (literally, even if not metaphorically) can only experience pleasure that way.
Professors Lee and George argue that there is an important sense in which the
marital couple is one organism when engaged in coitus because "with respect to one
function [reproduction] the male and the female are not complete."'42 Professor
Finnis makes a similar claim. 3 Yet, even if the couple becomes one organism with
respect to reproduction," it does not follow that the couple would additionally
experience pleasure as one organism. If Finnis, Lee, and George are not making the
claim that the couple experiences pleasure as one organism (and it is not clear what
non-metaphorical meaning such a claim could have if it is to describe something
occurring in this world), then they may be unable to distinguish between the couple
enjoying sodomitical relations and the couple enjoying penile-vaginal relations in
terms of how they experience pleasure. Individuals having sodomitical relations
might feel as if they have become one and, in addition, as if they are experiencing
pleasure not as individuals but as part of a greater unit, even if in fact they are
experiencing pleasure individually. Indeed, the feelings of oneness and pleasure
resulting from sodomitical relations might be indistinguishable from the feelings of
oneness and pleasure resulting from penile-vaginal relations.
According to these theorists, the reason that sodomitical sex (whether performed
by same-sex or opposite sex partners) cannot be a marital act is not dependent upon
how the pleasure is experienced. Rather, the crucial point is that the individuals
cannot through their sodomitical relations become "physically or organically one.' 45
Of course, there is a sense in which sodomitical partners have become physically
one, for example, because they are physically interconnected. Nonetheless, that is
not the sense of physical oneness which these theorists claim is all-important.
Rather, the physical oneness must be a result of an act that is procreative, at least
in type.46
Lee -and George assert that when a husband and wife engage in marital
intercourse, "there is an identifiable, real act and basic human good in which they
share, namely, the act of initiating or renewing their marital union in their becoming
organically one., 47 However, according to these theorists, husband and wife can
only become organically one by engaging in penile-vaginal relations. Married
couples will not be able to initiate or renew their marital union through sodomitical
42. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 144.
43. See Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 34 ("The union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife really
unites them biologically (and their biological reality is part of, not merely an instrument of, their personal reality);
reproduction is one function and so, in respect of that function, the spouses are indeed one reality.").
44. But cf. Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Morality, and Sexual Complementarity, in SEX. PREFERENCE,
AND FAMILY 227, 228 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) (suggesting that the notion of a
biological unit is "unusual if not bizarre").
45. See Lee & George, supra note 4, at 147; see also Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 34.
46. See infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text.
47. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 147.
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relations, even if those relations represent love or commitment to the parties
themselves.
Lee and George are not merely claiming that there is a basic human good in
renewing a deep and abiding commitment through sexual relations. Rather, they are
claiming something much more restrictive in what can even count as a human good.
Consider two couples, one married a few days and the other to marry next week.
The husband and wife have sexual relations and, in so doing, the individuals
become organically one, thereby initiating or renewing their total commitment.
However, the soon-to-be-husband and wife, who have the same kind of sexual
relations and the same thoughts and feelings as the already married couple, will
nonetheless be unable thereby to initiate or renew their commitment." The latter
couple would not merely be unable to initiate or renew their marital commitment
(since they are not yet married), but also unable to initiate or renew their emotional,
spiritual, or any other kind of ("real") commitment.
Professors Lee and George argue that unmarried individuals who have sexual
relations or married individuals who have the wrong kind of sexual relations will
be unable to bring about a real common good.49 While such individuals "may intend
or wish otherwise, their act is in reality a using of their own and each others' bodies
as a means of obtaining a pleasurable experience, which might include the illusory
experience of a union which they are not by this action promoting or effecting in
any way."' The reason that such individuals can only have an illusory experience
of a union is that the only real common good sought by these individuals would be
the "act of initiating or renewing their marital union in their becoming organically
one."" Thus, Professors Lee and George do not only claim that individuals who are
not married cannot enjoy the common good of marriage; they also claim that these
individuals cannot enjoy any common good at all. So, too, individuals who are
married but having sodomitical relations neither share in the good involved in being
organically one nor share in any good at all. It does not matter that these individuals
may be expressing or sharing their love in these unapproved ways52-these sexual
relations would involve no common good.53
Professor Finnis offers a similar analysis. He suggests that "the common good
of friends who are not and cannot be married (for example, man and man, man and
boy, woman and woman) has nothing to do with their having children by each other,
and their reproductive organs cannot make them a biological (and therefore
personal) unit."' Bracketing for a moment that the question at hand is whether a
man and a man or a woman and a woman can be married, a separate issue is
whether there is a common good which same-sex couples can share through their
sexual activity which has nothing to do with the having of children. If so, then the
48. See id. at 148.
49. See id (stating that the to-be maried individuals "really do become one flesh in the sexual act, and so
their act seems to be a sharing in a common good") (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 147.
51. Id.
52. They admit that sodomitical relations may be intended to involve an expression of love. See id. at 146.
53. See id. at 154 ("[N]o actual organic unity is present in sodomitical acts, and there is not any other
human good instantiated by such acts.").
54. Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 34.
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fact that such couples could not experience the common good which these theorists
insist is reserved for heterosexual couples would not establish that there could be
no common good that would be actualized when same-sex couples have sexual
relations.55
At least one of the difficulties with the above theories is in Professors Finnis,
Lee, and George's arbitrary limitation of the number of common goods. Even if
marital union is a common good, that does not establish that it is the only common
good.56 Other types of sexual relations between married and unmarried couples can
be morally permissible, at least in part, precisely because such relations can
promote a variety of common goods including love, commitment, etc.
Just as these theories have an impoverished view of what can be a common good,
they have an impoverished view of what can be intrinsically good. For example,
Professors Lee and George suggest that pleasure "is not by itself an intrinsic
good,"" apparently believing that individuals who believe pleasure worthy of
pursuit for its own sake must embrace "a hedonistic theory of value."M But that is
false, as is evident when one considers what such a theory holds and the bases upon
which such a theory has been criticized.
When explaining his Utilitarian theory, John Stuart Mill suggested that "pleasure
and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things... are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means
to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. 59 While Mill offered a
somewhat complex theory of pleasures,' he nonetheless suggested that pleasure and
avoidance of pain were the only things that were desirable in themselves.
G.E. Moore criticized Hedonism--"the doctrine that pleasure alone is good as
an end"6 -- because it was too limited in what it would admit as inherently good.62
However, Moore was careful to point out that the "doctrine that pleasure, among
other things, is good as an end, is not Hedonism."63 Further, even he would not
dispute that pleasure was among the goods to be pursued as ends." Thus, non-
hedonists can claim that pleasure, among other things, is intrinsically good and
worthy of pursuit, thereby disagreeing with Professors Lee and George that pleasure
is not to be desired for its own sake, while at the same time denying the hedonic
theory of value which holds that pleasure is the only intrinsic good.65
The point here should not be misunderstood. It is not argued here that because
something would produce pleasure it therefore should be done. Murdering someone
55. See id (suggesting that no common good can be achieved because this marital common good cannot
be achieved).
56. See Perry, supra note 41, at 51 (suggesting that other common goods can result from interpersonal
sexual conduct).
57. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 153.
58. Id
59. John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 210 (J.M. Robson ed.
1969).
60. See id. at 210-213 (discussing his theory of the higher and lower pleasures).
61. See GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETmICA 62 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1959) (1903).
62. See id
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. They seem not to appreciate this difference. See Lee & George, supra note 4, at 153.
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in his sleep would not be justified even if the would-be murderer might find that
activity quite pleasurable. Refusing to keep one's promise would not be justified
merely because one might thereby be able to do something quite enjoyable. Yet,
these claims hardly establish that pleasure is not something to be sought for its own
sake," but at most that pleasure is not the only good to be sought.
Numerous things might be claimed to be intrinsically desirable-knowledge,
beauty, health, truth, love, pleasure, etc. Further, it is notoriously difficult to
establish which things are in fact intrinsically good.67 One might, following Mill,
argue that humans by their very nature find only certain things desirable-he argued
that "human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part
of happiness or a means of happiness."' However, the point here is not to argue for
Mill's claim that pleasure or happiness is the only intrinsic good, but merely
pleasure's intrinsic goodness cannot be so cavalierly dismissed. So, too, the intrinsic
goodness of love, whether between same-sex or opposite-sex individuals, cannot be
so cavalierly dismissed."9
Sodomitical acts are non-marital and morally impermissible only because of a
cramped notion of what is intrinsically valuable and of what can be a common good.
There is no reason to think that consensual marital relations are morally
impermissible merely because both parties are hoping thereby to please their
partners or themselves. Further, if marital parties engage in consensual sodomitical
relations as a way of expressing their love, there seems to be no reason to think
these relations are either non-marital or immoral. Finally, there seems to be no
reason to think that unmarried adult parties who are engaging in consensual, loving
sexual relations are engaging in morally impermissible activity.
B. Organic Unity
Central to the theory offered by Professors Lee and George is that only certain
kinds of marital relations make the participants "organically one."'7 These theorists
make very clear that sterile couples can become organically one,71 although the
explanation for why that is so is less clear than these theorists believe. Indeed, it is
difficult to tell, for example, whether their theory has different dictates than does
the theory of Professor Finnis, and a comparison of these two theories will at least
suggest where and why both theories have possibly fatal weaknesses.
Professors Lee and George suggest that sterile couples are able to become
organically one when engaging in penile-vaginal intercourse because "[pleople who
66. A separate question is whether an act- or rule-utilitarian could account for the duty not to do these
things. For a discussion of Mill's utilitarianism and how he might respond to these kinds of examples, see MARK
STRAssER, THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 23-45 (1991).
67. Cf. Mill, supra note 59, at 208 ("The medical art is proved to be good, by its conducing to health; but
how it is possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it
produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good?"); see also Robert P. George & Gerard
V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. LJ. 301,307 (1995) ("Intrinsic value cannot, strictly
speaking, be demonstrated.")
68. Mill, supra note 59, at 237.
69. Cf. Perry, supra note 41, at 43 ("In my view, any sexual conduct between consenting adults is morally
deficient to the extent it is unloving .... ).
70. See Lee & George, supra note 4, at 147.
71. See id at l50.
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are not temporarily or permanently infertile could procreate by performing exactly
the same type of act which the infertile married couple perform and by which they
consummate or actualize their marital communion." '72 The difference between the
fertile and infertile couple "is not a difference in what they do-the kind of
act-but in a condition extrinsic to what they do."7" Thus, because the behavior of
the sterile couple does not differ from what it would be were they fertile and
wanting to procreate, their acts can be marital.
Lee and George might seem to have set out a clear criterion to determine whether
particular sexual relations are marital, namely, whether they involve the type of act
by which couples procreate. However, upon closer examination, it becomes
apparent that the criterion is not particularly clear and, further, that its use may have
surprising results.
Consider an issue that Lee and George do not explicitly address-whether
voluntarily sterilized individuals can become organically one. They note that if a
husband and wife "become sterile, this does not change what they have been doing
in bed: they still perform the same kind of act they have been doing for years."74
While these theorists are probably considering naturally caused sterility,75 their
rationale suggests that the cause of the sterility should not matter, since the husband
and wife will presumably be performing the same kind of act they have been doing
for years.
Suppose that a husband and wife decide that they wish not to have any additional
children and become sterilized so that they can continue to have sexual relations
without fear that they might thereby procreate. Their having become sterilized will
"not change what they have been doing in bed: they [will] still perform the same
kind of act they have been doing for years."7 6 It would seem, then, that according
to these theorists the sterilized couple would be engaging in a morally permissible
activity when having sexual relations, because fertile people could procreate by
performing exactly the same kind of act which this couple performs,77 even if this
husband and wife intentionally brought about their own inability to conceive.
Consider a different couple who does not want children now but is quite open to
having children sometime in the future. They use contraception immediately before
engaging in sexual relations. The difference between this couple and the voluntarily
sterile couple involves a difference in what they do. People who are fertile cannot
procreate if the type of sexual act which they perform includes (infallible)
contraception.7 Thus, on first reading, it would seem that the couple that is
voluntarily sterilized can engage in marital acts (because their inability to procreate
is not a difference in what they do but in an extrinsic condition), but that the couple
that uses contraception as a part of their lovemaking cannot. At the very least, this
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. See id (discussing "sexual acts later in life, for example, after the female spouse has become infertile").
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See id. at 150.
78. It might be argued that even contracepted sex is permissible as long as there is some chance that the
contraception wili be ineffective and that pregnancy might result from the sexual relations. Certainly, Prof. Finnis
does not adopt such an approach. See infra notes 100-03, 106-07 and accompanying text.
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result seems quite ironic. The couple that has decided to not have children and thus
has become sterilized can engage in marital acts but the couple open to having
children sometime in the future will be unable to engage in marital acts until they
are in fact ready to have children. Further, the sterile couple who cannot have
children would allegedly be engaging in a type of procreative act but the couple
using contraception who might nonetheless end up procreating (because of the
method's fallibility) would not be.79
Suppose that a married couple normally uses contraception immediately before
having sexual relations. However, on one particular occasion, no contraception is
used. Would the act then be marital? The act would seem to be the kind of act by
which individuals procreate.' However, suppose that the wife were to take a
morning-after pill to prevent pregnancy. The question would then be whether taking
the pill the following day should be considered part of the sexual act (thus making
it non-marital) or whether it should be considered a separate act (thus permitting the
previous evening's relations to be considered marital). Presumably, it would be
quite tempting to say that what is done up to seventy-two hours after the act"' should
not be included as part of the act. Were that the appropriate analysis, then according
to this theory sexual relations might be marital, use of contraception notwithstand-
ing, as long as the "correct" contraceptive method was used.
It might be argued that use of the morning-after pill is sufficiently close to the
occurrence of the sexual act (both in time and purpose) that it should be considered
part of the act. On this analysis, the sexual relations would not be marital, since the
couple using protection (whether soon after or immediately before engaging in
sexual relations) would differ from other couples in what they did when having
sexual relations. Yet, even if use of a morning-after pill is deemed close enough in
time to be included within the sexual act, thus making it non-marital, it is not clear
that other forms of contraception, which are even less closely tied to particular
sexual acts (both in time and in immediate purpose), can be treated in the same way.
Consider a woman who takes the pill once a month or has an injection of Depo-
Provera every three months.' Or, perhaps, consider a woman who is using
Norplant, who might thereby have contraception provided for five years. 3 Should
these uses of contraception be considered part of the act of intercourse,
notwithstanding that the contraceptive "act" might have occurred days, months, or
years earlier? The analysis is complicated even further by comparing two women
who use Norplant, one because she had been ordered by a court to do so 4 and the
79. See Stacey L Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or Crime Control?,
40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 87 (1992) (suggesting a 12% failure rate for condom use).
80. But see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (suggesting that at least according to Professor Fmnis
this act would not be marital because the couple was willing to use contraception at other times).
81. See Julie Brienza, State Law Protects 'Conscientious Objector' Druggists, TRIAL, Aug. 34, 1998, at
86, 87 (discussing morning-after pills that "can prevent pregnancy when taken within 72 hours of unprotected
sex").
82. See Insuring Birth Control, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 14, 1999, at Al (an injection of Depo-Provera
provides contraception for three months).
83. See id.
84. See Sarah Gill, Discrimination, Historical Abuse, and the New Norplant Problem, 16 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 43, 50 (1994) (discussing different legislative proposals mandating use of Norplant under certain
conditions).
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other because she wished to have five years of contraception. Each would know that
procreation could not occur as a result of sexual relations, but one would have used
Norplant to achieve that result, whereas the other would have used it only because
she had been forced to do so.
Perhaps the first woman, but not the second, would be able to engage in marital
acts because her condition of being unable to procreate had not been chosen.
However, this analysis would have changed the relevant criterion-it would no
longer be whether the act was different from what fertile couples do but, instead,
what had caused the extrinsic condition. However, if the relevant question is
whether the extrinsic condition was chosen, then it may be important to establish
whether sexual orientation is chosen rather than set early in life (assuming, of
course, that the sexual orientation itself might be viewed as the reason that
particular individuals would not be engaging in penile-vaginal sexual relations).85
Perhaps the appropriate question would involve what the individual would have
done had she not been using Norplant, although that changes the analysis yet again
and now incorporates a consideration of what the individual would have done had
the extrinsic condition not existed. Were this the relevant criterion, one would have
to ask whether the naturally sterile couple would have used contraception had one
of them not been sterile. 6 One also might have to ask what the individuals would
have done had their sexual orientation been different.8 7
By focussing on whether the marital couple engages in a type of procreative act,
Professors Finnis, Lee, and George would seem committed to calling some kinds
of protected sex marital and other kinds not. This view may have other surprising
implications. Consider the view that individuals using the rhythm method are
engaging in morally permissible activity but that those using other contraceptive
methods are not. 8 This view is not founded on the assumption that the rhythm
method is less effective, since it is not markedly less effective than some
impermissible methods used 9 and is more effective than others," but founded on
the view that the rhythm method is natural rather than artificial.91
85. Whether orientation is genetic or established early in life, it would in either case not be chosen.
86. Professor Finnis would ask this question, although he does not seem to acknowledge that this has shifted
the relevant criterion from act-types to other kinds of considerations. See infra notes 106-7 and accompanying text.
87. See Finnis (1), supra note 4, at 28 n.46. It is not clear that Professor Fmnis appreciates that what he and
Professor Macedo are disagreeing about (at least in note 46 of his article) is precisely this question.
88. See S1 Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do They Protect Internationally Recognized Human Rights
and Minimize the Potential for Violence within a Society?, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT',L 1, 35 n.173 (1997) (noting
that the only legitimate means of birth control according to the Catholic Church is the rhythm method).
89. See Jeffrey D. Goldberg, Comment, Involuntary Servitudes: A Property-Based Notion of Abortion-
Choice, 38 UCLA L REV. 1597, 1638 n.148 (1991) ("The failure rate of the rhythm method is only two percent
higher than the failure rate of a condom.")
90. See Rebecca J. Cook, International Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 645, 722 n.291 (1992) (suggesting that the failure rate for the rhythm method is 10-12% lower than the
failure rate for spermicides). For the suggestion that the rhythm method is slightly more effective than the use of
spenricides, see Arthur, supra note 79, at 87 (suggesting a 1% difference in failure rate).
91. See Jane Hochberg, Comment, The Sacred Heart Story: Hospital Mergers and Their Effects on
Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REv. 945, 950 n.44 (1996) (discussing view of Catholic Church that rhythm
method was natural, approved method of contraception); Gregory M. Saylin, Note, The United Nations
International Conference on Population and Development: Religion, Tradition, and Law in Latin America, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 1245, 1270 (1995) (discussing Vatican disapproval of artificial contraception methods).
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Yet, the criterion offered by Professors Finnis, Lee, and George is not whether
the contraceptive act is natural rather than artificial but whether the sexual behavior
is the correct type of act. If part of what goes into the typing of acts involves the
intention of the parties and if part of the intention is to avoid conception, then it
may make sense to include the timing of the behavior within the description of the
act. Consider playing music loudly in one's apartment. Doing this at 3 o'clock in
the morning might make this a different type of act than playing music at 3 o'clock
in the afternoon. However, if indeed the timing of the act should be included within
the typing of the act, then couples using the rhythm method may not be performing
the kind of act which is procreative, and thus would be acting impermissibly when
using the rhythm method. Further, the timing implicated in the use of the rhythm
method is much more closely connected to this particular act itself than is the timing
implicated in having decided to use Norplant four years earlier. Thus, this analysis
seems to suggest that Norplant users can engage in marital acts while individuals
making use of the rhythm method cannot, although some would argue that no sexual
activities which include contraception would be morally permissible,' since these
are not the types of acts which result in procreation.
Yet another difficulty might be posed for the theory offered by Professors Lee
and George. Consider two lesbians in a long-term relationship who make artificial
insemination part of their lovemaking. It would simply be false to say that this
couple would be unable to perform the type of act that might result in children,
since their act might in fact result in pregnancy. If their activity is viewed as a type
of act which cannot be reproductive, then there would be the unusual result that
sexual relations which might in fact result in the birth of a child would not be
considered of the reproductive type, but sexual relations (for example, between a
sterile husband and wife) which could not be reproductive would be considered of
the correct reproductive type.93
Professors Lee and George suggest that "the difference between any heterosexual
couple engaging in penile-vaginal intercourse and a homosexual couple is... [that
the] lack of complementarity in homosexual couples is a condition which renders
it impossible for them to perform the kind of act which makes them organically
one."94 The question at hand of course is what kinds of acts can make two
individuals organically one. If indeed the criterion is whether the act might result
in a child, then it may be mistaken to exclude same-sex couples unless much more
is said about how such acts are to be delimited and why that delimitation is justified.
Certainly, one might argue that the typing of acts offered above merely reflects
which acts are within a particular "natural kind."95 However, there might be a
variety of natural kinds. For example, a different natural kind might include those
acts that might result in children and yet another natural kind might include those
92. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listening for the Future in the Voices of the Past: John T. Noonan, Jr. on
Love and Power in Human History, II J. L & RELIGION 203, 205 (1994-95) (describing Augustine's "conviction
that all contraceptive practices (including the 'rhythm method') count as sinful violations of the prinmay procreative
purpose of marriage").
93. See MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTrrTION 55 (1997).
94. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 150.
95. See Fmnis (2), supra note 4. at 40.
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acts which communicate love or commitment. Yet another natural kind might
include those acts which are both potentially procreative and which communicate
love or commitment.9 The important issue would be to provide a way to decide
which natural kind was relevant for the purposes at hand. By the same token, it is
at best unhelpful to adopt a tactic offered by Professor Finnis which involves
justifying the natural kind by appealing to a "distinct rational kind,"97 since there
are many distinct rational kinds and the important issue will be which rational kind
will be relevant for the purposes at hand.
It simply will not do to suggest following Professors George and Lee that "in
sexual intercourse, the husband and the wife become one organism, but they do so
precisely as man and woman, precisely as potential father and mother.""8 This
analysis excludes the sterile couple, since they are not potentially father and mother.
Certainly, it is true that "no one could have children by performing sodomitical
acts"99 assuming, for example, that artificial insemination is not "permissibly"
incorporated within the act. Yet, it is also true that no one who is sterile can have
children by engaging in penile-vaginal intercourse and it is at best unclear why the
fact that others can have children when engaging in penile-vaginal intercourse
makes the sterile couple's intercourse even potentially procreative. While a
distinction can be made between penile-vaginal intercourse on the one hand and oral
or anal intercourse on the other, these theorists make it difficult to understand why
that is the relevant distinction for determining which acts can be truly marital.
Compare the view of Professors George and Lee to the view of Professor Finnis
who, when discussing those couples who can engage in "marital" relations, includes
those spouses who "happen to be sterile. ' '" °" He argues that the sexual relations of
the unintentionally sterile couple will involve an actualization, "so far as the
spouses then and there can [make them], of the reproductive function in which they
are biologically and thus personally one."'' Of course, the intentionally sterilized
spouses would also actualize, so far as they then and there could, the reproductive
function in which they are biologically and thus personally one, although according
to his theory they nonetheless can only engage in non-marital acts."
Professor Finnis explains that
sexual acts which are marital are 'of the reproductive kind' because in willing
such an act one wills sexual behavior which is (1) the very same as causes
generation (intended or unintended) in every case of human sexual reproduction,
and (2) the very same as one would will if one were intending precisely sexual
reproduction as a goal of a particular marital sexual act."°3
96. According to Professor Finis, sexual acts between husband and wife cannot be marital unless they both
have "procreative significance" and have the "generosity of acts of friendship." See id. at 35.
97. See id.
98. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 144.
99. Id. at 149.
100. See Finnis (1), supra note 4, at 29.
101. Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 35.
102. See id. at 38.
103. Id. at 40.
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Yet, the intentionally sterilized couple could claim that their sexual acts meet that
definition, claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Further, if the acts of the
intentionally sterilized couple can be distinguished from the acts of fertile couples,
notwithstanding that each couple. "does" the same thing, then one must wonder
whether the criterion offered for distinguishing between marital and non-marital
acts is actually being used. If the "real" criterion is not simply what the couples do,
then that should be made explicit.
Professors Finnis, Lee, and George offer an analysis in which their theories of
how acts are to be typed is crucial. However, the criteria that they offer for the
typing of acts do not yield the results which these theorists claim. The intentionally
sterilized couple would seem to engage in marital acts because they do what fertile
couples do. However, Professor Finnis explicitly denies that they can perform
marital acts and one infers that Professors Lee and George would agree with
Professor Finnis. These theorists seem unwilling to admit that such a couple would
be unable to reproduce because of the existence of an extrinsic condition rather than
because of what they do. Further, no part of the theory offered by these
commentators adequately explains why or how the genesis of an extrinsic condition
is itself important.
Certainly, the intentionally sterilized husband and wife do not become one
organism "precisely as potential father and mother,"" t but, then again, neither does
the accidentally sterile couple. The couple that uses contraception immediately
before lovemaking might seem to be doing something different from what is done
by other couples who do not use contraception, since the use of contraception
immediately before engaging in sexual relations might be viewed as part of the
sexual act. However, when one couple made use of a long-term contraceptive drug
weeks, months, or years earlier, it is not at all clear that this couple's lovemaking
could be distinguished from another's in terms of what the two couples do.
C. On Marital and Non-Marital Acts
Suppose that a non-question-begging theory of act-typing could be offered which
would enable one to distinguish between marital and non-marital sexual acts. A
separate question would be whether a married couple could engage in both kinds
of acts. When Professors Lee and George suggest that "in the case of chaste marital
intercourse, spouses participate in the real good of marital bodily union,"' 5 it is not
clear whether they mean that the act can be marital as long as that act of intercourse
is chaste (for example, involves penile-vaginal relations, does not involve any third
parties, and is not solely to produce pleasure) or whether they mean that all of the
couple's sexual acts must be chaste if they are ever to engage in marital acts.
Professor Finnis makes his position very clear, suggesting that a couple would
be unable to engage in marital acts if they "would be willing in some
circumstance(s) to engage in a sex act of a non-marital kind."' ° Thus, for example,
the naturally sterile couple who would have used contraception had one of them not
104. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 144.
105. Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added).
106. See Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 38.
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been sterile would be unable to engage in marital acts, notwithstanding their
engagment in the type of act by which fertile couples reproduce. So, too, the person
who might be willing under certain circumstances to engage in adultery, sodomitical
relations, or premarital sex can never engage in marital acts. Professor Finnis
explains that "the complete exclusion of non-marital sex acts from the range of
acceptable human options is a pre-condition for the truly marital character of any
spouses' intercourse."'"o 7
There are at least two points to note. First, Professor Finnis' theory precludes a
substantial percentage of the population from being able to engage in an act of a
marital kind, given the number of individuals who engage in premarital sex. 08
Indeed, his theory about who can perform marital acts is quite restrictive, since
one's regarding "one or more of the non-marital types of sex act as morally
acceptable""' would also mean that one could not engage in marital acts. Thus, his
theory would exclude both those who performed non-marital acts and those who
believed that such acts might be permissible, even if the individuals themselves had
not engaged in such acts.
As a second point, his position does not seem to rely on a particular version of
the typing of acts, since even couples doing exactly what they should to have a child
will nonetheless be engaging in non-marital acts if, for example, they would use if
contraception conditions were different and pregnancy was to endanger the life or
health of the mother. ° Thus, notwithstanding his claims about the importance of
what people do and his claims that his theory is simply "the articulation of married
people's commonsense appreciation of the offensiveness of adultery and of being
treated by one's spouse as a mere object of sexual relief,"11' Professor Finnis makes
clear that his theory is much more complicated and much less commonsensical than
he represents. For example, while his condemnation of adultery may reflect current
attitudes," 2 his condemnation of the use of contraception does not."
3
It is unclear whether Professors Lee and George believe that anyone willing
under some circumstances to engage in non-marital acts can ever engage in marital
ones. However, they offer their own startling claim, suggesting that it is not clear
107. Id. at 39 (emphasis omitted).
108. See Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L REV. 1933, 1970 (1992) (suggesting
that a Kinsey Institute survey found that "nearly 60% of the respondents had had a premarital sexual experience").
109. Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 39.
110. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 500 (1961) (describing a pregnancy which would be very perilous
to life).
111. Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 39.
112. See Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83
MINN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1998) ("[C]ommitting adultery still carries enough disapproval to tempt people to lie
about their private sexual lives."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1297 (1998) ("[Slocial norms prescribe acceptable marital behavior and proscribe ...
adultery."). But see Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission Of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence In
Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 186 (1993) ("[Tlhe majority of Americans-classified by sex, age
group, race, or religious affiliation-no longer condemn fornication and adultery.").
113. See Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the United
States and England, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 535, 596 (1995) (discussing the "fact that birth control
measures are publicly accepted"); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 516 (1992) (discussing growing acceptance of birth control).
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how incest, bestiality, and pedophilia "could be immoral if the explanation of the
meaning and nature of sexual acts proposed by those opposing ... [their] view were
correct.""' ' Allegedly, individuals who believe sodomitical or contracepted sex is
morally permissible cannot at the same time believe sexual relations with children
is immoral, notwithstanding the lack of consent on the part of the child or the great
harms that might befall those children who are subjected to adults' sexual
advances." 5 Yet, surely, issues of consent and harm are important in the
consideration of the moral permissibility of particular practices, and individuals
who believe adult consensual sodomy is morally permissible are not thereby
committed to accepting the moral permissibility of having sex with children.
D. On Being Open Towards Having and Raising Children
Professors Lee and George distinguish their view of marriage from the
instrumentalist view by suggesting that marriage is good in and of itself, and
distinguish their view from those denying the importance of children by suggesting
that a childless marriage "lacks its complete natural fulfillment."'" 6 More must be
said about the role of children in marriage.
When it is suggested that the purpose of marriage is the "conceiving and raising
of children," this does not merely mean that marriage is to provide a secure and
supportive setting in which, for example, adopted children might be raised. Nor
should it be understood to mean that marriage is to provide a setting in which the
biological children of one of the partners might be raised, for example, children
from a prior marriage or children produced through the use of artificial insemination
or surrogacy after these partners had begun their relationship. Rather, on this view,
marriage is only for those who plan to have children through their union. If this
view were less restrictive in the ways that children might become part of a family,
then gay and lesbian unions might also be categorized as open to the conceiving and
raising of children," 7 and thus might be thought both intrinsically and
instrumentally valuable even by these theorists.
Professor Finnis suggests that marital faithfulness makes "little or no sense"1 8
if the marriage does not have an orientation toward children "who each can only
have two parents and who are fittingly the primary responsibility (and object of
114. See Lee & George, supra note 4, at 156.
115. See Carol W. Napier, Note, Civil Incest Suits: Getting Beyond the Statute of Limitations, 68 WASH. U.
L.Q. 995, 1003 (1990) ("The sexual abuse of any child is extremely damaging. When the abuse is inflicted by a
member of the family, however, the harm to the child is even more severe."); Lynne Olman Lourim, Note, Parents
and the State: Joining Forces to Report Incest and Support Its Victims, 28 U. MICH. J.L REFoRM 715, 716 (1995)
("Incest victims suffer long-lasting, life-threatening consequences which are unique to this type of sexual abuse.");
Barbara A. Micheels, Comment, Is Justice Served? The Development of Tort Liability Against the Passive Parent
in the Incest Cases, 41 ST. Louis U. L. 809, 814 (1997) ("[T1he incest victim suffers a two-fold harm. There is
an immediate harm which may consist of actual physical injury and psychological responses such as depression,
anxiety, injury, acting-out behavior and serious personality disturbances. Long-lasting secondary harms of a
psychological and emotional nature may not be manifested until many years later.").
116. See Lee & George, supra note 4, at 143.
117. See Dean v. DisL of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,345 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that between eight and ten million children are being raised in gay and lesbian
households).
118. See Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 41.
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devotion) of those two parents....9 Yet, by this, Professor Finnis does not merely
mean that the two parents should have an emotional connection to the children but
in addition must have a biological connection to them.120 Ironically, Professor
Finnis is unwilling to approve of the only method by which some couples would be
able (on his theory) to have their marriage "make sense," since he seems unwilling
.to countenance the use of modem (and not so modem) reproductive techniques to
aid conception, which might be the only way that the husband and wife could each
have a biological connection to their child.
Consider a husband and wife who can only conceive by making use of in vitro
fertilization (1YF). Or, consider a couple who can only have a child if they make use
of artificial insemination by donor (AID) or artificial insemination by husband
(AIH). The couple having a child in any of these ways would not thereby have
engaged in a marital act, since their act would not have been "the very same as
causes generation (intended or unintended) in every case of human sexual
reproduction." ' Yet, if indeed a couple making use of AIH, AID, or IVF would
thereby be engaging in a non-marital act and if indeed their willingness to engage
in a non-marital act would mean that they could never engage in a marital act, then
the couple open to having children in this way could never engage in marital acts.
Further, such a couple could engage in marital acts only if they did not make use of
the sole techniques (IVF or AIH) whereby they might have a child biologically
related to each of them.
Certainly, even if the couple making use of iVF or AIH would not thereby be
engaging in a marital act, they nonetheless might have a relationship that is
"oriented toward the begetting, nurturing, and educating of children together."'122
Further, their marriage would no longer lack its "complete natural fulfillment. '2 3
Ironically, one would expect that those who believe marriage both intrinsically
worthwhile and instrumentally related to the production and raising of children
would be open to the use of different methods by which children might be brought
into loving families, and thus would encourage rather than discourage families to
have children in these ways among others.
Not only does Professor Finnis's theory preclude couples who wish to engage in
marital acts from using these reproductive technologies by which to have children,
but he suggests that because such couples would be childless they would have little
reason to be faithful to each other. 4 Perhaps as a consolation, he suggests that
sterile, childless couples might choose to be faithful because that ':form of life...
makes good sense."'" He does not seem to appreciate that same-sex couples without
children might also choose that form of life." 6 Nor does he seem to appreciate that
couples with children who are not biologically related to each of them might choose
119. Id.
120. See id. (discussing the importance of the element involving the generation of the children).
121. See id. at 40.
122. Lee & George, supra note 4, at 143.
123. See Id.
124. See Finnis (2), supra note 4, at 41 ("Apart from this orientation towards children, the institution of
marriage, characterized by maritalfides (faithfulness), would make little or no sense.").
125. See id. at 42.
126. See id. at 41.
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to be faithful for the sake of those children or out of the belief that such a form of
life "makes good sense."
A theorist claiming that the purposes of marriage include fostering procreation
and providing "status and stability to the environment in which children are
raised"'27 might disagree with the views of marriage expressed by Professors Lee,
George, and Finnis. This disagreement might stem from the belief that (1) there are
other or additional primary purposes of marriage and thus people who do not want
children might nonetheless appropriately marry, or (2) marriage is to provide a
setting in which children might be raised even if those children are not born through
the union of the couple that will raise them. Indeed, even one who believed the sole
purpose of marriage was to provide a stable and secure setting in which children
might thrive need not insist that only those children biologically related to each
parent would belong in that setting. On the contrary, one might expect that
marriages would be "naturally fulfilled" even if the children had been adopted.
Certainly, it is eminently reasonable to believe that marriages need not include
children to be intrinsically valuable. Professors Lee and George admit as much, and
thus it might seem surprising that they would suggest that same-sex couples should
not be allowed to marry, even were it true that such couples never had or raised
children. As a separate matter, however, those who believe that marriage is for the
production and raising of children without also believing that the children must be
produced through the sexual union of the husband and wife, would seem committed
to arguing that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry rather than prohibited
from marrying, precisely because gay and lesbian couples do have and raise
children, even if those children are not biologically related to each parent.
2 8
III. ON MARRIAGE AND THE STATE
While one issue is whether same-sex couples can perform marital acts or fulfill
the functions of marriage as defined by a particular theory, another issue is whether
same-sex couples can perform marital acts or fulfill the functions of marriage as
defined by the law. The kinds of limitations which Professors Finnis, Lee, and
George impose on marriage and marital acts simply are not reflected in the law.
Thus, insofar as the law is going to apply its own explicit or implicit standards and
purposes to determine whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, the
state should recognize such unions, since those marriages would meet the standards
and serve the purposes of marriage recognized by the state.
A. The Right to Privacy
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "[c]hoices about marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights" that are
127. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124. (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.
1982).
128. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On
Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L REV. 921, 959 (1995)
("The state's compelling interest in providing a stable home for the raising of children is a reason to allow rather
than prohibit same-sex marriage.").
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"of basic importance in our society." '129 The "[liaw affords constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing and education."'3 In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,3' the plurality suggested that "choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."'3 One's choice of a life partner would certainly seem to
qualify as a choice central to personal dignity and autonomy and thus would seem
to deserve protection by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the theories offered by Professors Finnis,
Lee, and George is that their positions comport so poorly with the views of marriage
expressed implicitly and explicitly by the state. Consider Professor Finnis' view that
anyone willing to engage in non-marital acts will be unable to ever engage in
marital acts. Were the state to adopt such a view, it would hardly recognize a
fundamental right for marital couples to use contraception." On the contrary, the
state would presumably say that the use of contraception is antithetical to, and
incompatible with, marriage, and hence is not a right to be recognized by the state.
One would never expect courts to recognize a right to sodomy only within
marriage, 135 since that is exactly the context in which such practices allegedly
should not be recognized. 36 That the state recognizes a constitutional right for
marital couples to use contraception but criminalizes pedophilia suggests that
Professors George and Lee are missing something important.
Perhaps an examination of current law will help support the basic position that
these theorists offer-the fact that the state recognizes a constitutional right to
marry but may criminalize same-sex sodomy might be thought to establish the
impossibility of same-sex marriage. Yet, this suggestion ignores the fact that a
variety of states criminalize sodomy whether performed by same-sex or opposite-
sex couples.'37 It further ignores that even those states criminalizing sodomy are
129. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971)).
130. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (citing Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 851.
133. See generally, STRASSER, supra note 93, at 49-74 (suggesting that same-sex marriage should be
protected by the right to privacy). See also Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CL 1998 WL
88743, at * 6 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998) ("[Just as the 'decision to marry and raise a child in a traditional
family setting' is constitutionally protected as a fundamental right, so too should the decision to choose one's life
partner and have a recognized nontraditional family be constitutionally protected.").
134. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing right of married couples to
contraception).
135. See State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980) (right to privacy did not include right of unmarried
individuals to have sodomitical relations).
136. To the credit of Professor Finnis, he does not believe that the distinction between same-sex and opposite
sex sodomy is legally relevant, since either is allegedly non-marital. See Finnis (1), supra note 4, at 29, 31. The
United States Supreme Court implied that there might be a constitutionally significant difference between the two.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court suggested that the issue before it was whether "the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy," even though the statute at issue
had not distinguished between same-sex and opposite-sex sodomy. See id at 190, 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Family Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality: Questioning the Assumptions, 7
TEMP. POL & CWV. RTS. L REV. 285, 293 n.42 (1998) (suggesting that of those states having sodomy laws, more
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arguably constitutionally required to have an implicit if not explicit exception for
marital couples engaging in consensual sodomy.13 8 While the right of consenting
adults to engage in sodomitical relations is arguably protected by the United States
Constitution, 39 Bowers. v. Hardwick"4 notwithstanding, 4 the recognition of that
right is not required for the position articulated here. Thus, suppose that the United
States Supreme Court were to hold this year that non-marital sodomy was not
constitutionally protected. Were a state to allow same-sex couples to marry, the
couples would presumably have a constitutional right to engage in consensual
sodomitical relations, even if unmarried same-sex couples did not have that right. 42
The analyses of Professors Finnis, George, and Lee regarding which acts are marital
are not helpful in deciding whether the state should legally recognize same-sex
unions precisely because the Constitution protects the right of married couples to
engage in a variety of "non-marital" acts.
Professor Lee and George's view suggests that the state cannot justify permitting
contraceptive or sodomitical sex without also permitting pedophilia.' 43 Fortunately,
the state recognizes that a number of issues and harms might be implicated in the
latter that are not implicated in the former.'" The disparity between their view and
the state's suggests either that these professors may be failing to include relevant
considerations within their analysis or, at any rate, that their analysis of what is
morally permissible and impermissible is sufficiently dissimilar to the kind of
analysis that occurs in the law that their conclusions have little relevance for what
the law should be.
B. Which Marriages Are Valid?
Professor Finnis suggests that his view of marriage is reflected in the law
because, traditionally, marriages were not viewed as consummated unless the
parties had engaged in penile-vaginal sex. 145 Yet, this point does not have the import
which Professor Finnis suggests, because he is conflating the implications of having
attempted to contract a void marriage with the implications of having contracted a
voidable one. A void marriage is "void from its inception without any decree of the
court and for all purposes,'"" However, a voidable marriage will be recognized by
than double have statutes criminalizing the behavior for both same- and opposite-sex couples compared to those
only criminalizing the behavior for same-sex couples).
138. See Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and Fundamental
Interests, 8 UCLA WoMEN's LJ. 313, 334 (1998).
139. See id. at 338.
140. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
141. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Justice Scalia suggested that the majority's decision in Romer
undercut the vitality of Bowers. See idL at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v.
Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L REV. 373, 374 (1997) (suggesting that little is left of Bowers after Romer).
142. See Strasser, supra note 138, at 334-35.
143. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing some of the differences).
145. Further, some jurisdictions now recognize that marriages can be consummated through sodomitical
relations. See, e.g., Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 336 n.33 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, A.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[flIn the District, couples of marriageable age may now lawfully consummate their
unions, if they choose to do so, through sodomy.").
146. People v. Kay, 252 N.Y.S. 518, 523 (1931).
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the state until it has been declared invalid.147 Marriages that have not been
consummated will at most be considered voidable rather than void. Thus, until the
non-consummated marriage had been annulled by a court, the state would recognize
the union of a couple who had never engaged in penile-vaginal relations or, for that
matter, had never engaged in sexual relations at all.S Further, if indeed both parties
knew before the marriage that there would be no penile-vaginal relations or no
sexual relations at all, the marriage might not be voidable merely because the
couples had not engaged in sexual relations. 49 Thus, for example, the state would
not preclude a severely physically handicapped individual from marrying even if he
could not engage in sexual relations at all. Further, as long as both of the parties
who had agreed to marry understood what the marriage would be like, the state
might refuse to allow the marriage to be annulled because it was non-consummated
(inability to engage in marital acts notwithstanding).
There is yet another reason that the positions offered by Professors Finnis,
George, and Lee are undermined by existing practices concerning which marriages
are recognized and which are not. Some states permit first cousins to marry only if
they are unable to have children. 5 The concern of these states is only that the
couple will be unable to have children through their union-it does not matter to
these states how or why that condition came about. It is thus obvious both that these
states do not believe procreation an essential element of marriage, since for some
couples the potential to procreate would be the condition that would prevent their
legally marrying, and that these states do not believe the distinction between natural
and voluntary sterility important, since that distinction simply plays no role in the
state's analysis regarding who can be married or who can engage in "marital" acts.
Existing practices also undermine the claim that marriage and family are only for
children who are the product of their parents' union. Indeed, were these theorists
correct about the importance of the children being biologically related to both
147. See In re Interest of S.I., 173 A.2d 457, 460 (N.J. App. Div. 1961) ("Until so annulled, however, this
court is required to recognize the marriage as valid.").
148. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.030(5) (1996) (stating that marriage is voidable if never consummated since
its celebration); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210(0 (West 1994) (stating marriage voidable if never consummated and one
party permanently incapable of having sexual relations); IDAHO CODE § 32-501(6) (1996) (stating marriage
voidable if incapacity to have sexual relations permanent and has existed since marriage began); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-04-01(6) (1997) (stating marriage voidable if one party permanently incapable of having sexual relations since
marriage began).
149. See Jarzem v. Bierhaus, 415 So.2d 88,90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (wife would not have been granted
divorce merely because she was not having sex with her husband; divorce was granted because he had fraudulently
claimed that he was unable to have sex but in fact was having sex with someone else); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1506(2)(a) (1993) (stating marriage is voidable if, unbeknownst to party at the time of the marriage, the
other party lacked the physical capacity to consummate the marriage); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02(b) (West 1990)
(stating marriage is voidable if, unbeknownst to party at the time of the marriage, the other party lacked the
physical capacity to consummate the marriage); WtS. STAT. ANN. § 767.03(2) (West 1993) (stating that a marriage
is voidable if unbeknownst to other party, one party lacked capacity to consummate since time of marriage).
150. See ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(B) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring both parties to be 65 or one party
unable to reproduce); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(4)(i)(ii) (West 1996) (requiring parties to be at least 50
or either party permanently and irreversibly sterile); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-2 (1997) (requiring that the parties
be at least 65); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (2)(a)&(b) (Supp. 1997) (requiring both to be 65 or both to be 55 and
one unable to reproduce); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(i) (West 1993) (requiring female to be 55 or submit affidavit
that she is permanently unable to reproduce).
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parents, one would not expect the state to say, for example, that the rights and
responsibilities of the adoptive parent are precisely the same as those of the
biological parent."' Nor would one expect the state to refuse to distinguish between
children born through the sexual union of the parents, and children born through
AIH, AID, or IYF. That the distinctions which are central to these theorists'
analyses are simply irrelevant in the eyes of the law suggests that their justifications
for refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry should have limited, if any,
persuasive power.
C. The State and Individual Interests in Marriage
Marriage promotes a number of state interests, for example, stability for the
parties themselves as well as for any children that might be raised in the family.152
Further, the promotion of marriage will limit the societal costs that are involved in
the disorganized breakdown of relationships, as well as provide an additional forum
for the education of the young.' Marriage promotes the maintenance of long-term
monogamous relationships, which might have public health benefits."M All of these
interests are promoted whether marital couples are composed of same-sex or
opposite-sex individuals.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized numerous individual interests
in marriage. Marriages are "expressions of emotional support and public
commitment."' 55 They may involve "an exercise of religious faith as well as an
expression of personal dedication,"'5 as well as be a "precondition to the receipt
of government benefits."' 57 Intimate relationships like marriage help to protect the
"individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."'5" Such
relationships can "act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State,"'59 and may "safeguard[] the ability independently to define one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty.' ' "W
All of these state and individual interests would be served even by a couple
raising children not biologically related to each of them, and many of these interests
would be promoted even were the couple childless. Further, all of these interests
would be implicated whether the couples were composed of individuals of the same
or different sexes. Because the institution of marriage promotes numerous state and
individual interests, whether or not children are produced, the state should
recognize same-sex unions. It is irrelevant that same-sex couples are unable to
151. See Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Adoptive parents have all the legal rights
... in their children as natural parents.").
152. See STRASSER, supra note 93, at 74.
153. See Mark Strasser. Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25
SUFFOLK U. L REV. 981,991 (1991).
154. See Michael E. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS and the Non-Traditional Family: The Argument
for State and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-Sex Marriages, 16 NOVA L REV. 809, 810 (1992)
(suggesting that same-sex marriages might have public health benefits).
155. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,95 (1987).
156. Id. at 96.
157. Id.
158. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
159. Id. at619.
160. Id.
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engage in marital acts according to the definitions offered by the theorists discussed
here, considering that these theories offer dictates which contradict other state
practices in the domestic relations area.
IV. CONCLUSION
Commentators suggest that because same-sex couples cannot engage in marital
acts they should not be allowed to marry. However, there are at least two basic
difficulties with such theories. First, they tend not to be internally consistent, since
the criteria offered to determine which acts are marital do not yield the results
which these theorists claim. Second, these theories neither account for existing
domestic relations practices nor for the state and individual interests recognized by
the law and, thus, even were these theories internally consistent, they still would not
be helpful in determining what the law should be.
The notion of marital and non-marital acts plays a much different role in right to
privacy jurisprudence than it does in the theories of these commentators. According
to these theorists, marital acts are only a subset of the possible consensual sexual
acts which married couples might perform. Yet, the law takes a much broader view
of marital acts, at least in part, because the right to privacy protects a variety of
consensual, sexual acts performed by married individuals that would not have
similar constitutional protection outside the bounds of marriage. Thus, an act's
being "marital" in the eyes of the law expands rather than contracts what is
permissible and constitutionally protected. The fact that certain non-marital same-
sex relations might be criminalizable does not establish that same-sex unions cannot
be recognized, just as the fact that certain non-marital opposite-sex relations might
be criminalizable does not establish that opposite-sex unions cannot be recognized
by the state. For example, the right of marital couples to engage in consensual
sexual relations solely for pleasure is protected by the Constitution, even if the same
is not true for unmarried couples."" Further, the difficult issue for courts has not
been whether consensual sodomitical relations within marriage are protected, but
whether nonconsensual sodomitical relations within marriage are nonetheless
protected by the right to privacy. 62
For these theorists, to call an act "marital" is to suggest that in addition to being
lawful the act meets certain additional criteria. However, in the law, the fact that a
consensual, sexual act is performed by a married couple and hence is marital, will
make lawful and permissible what otherwise might not be. It is at least in part
because the role of an act's being marital is so different in these theories than it is
in the law that these theories should be viewed as irrelevant for determining who
should be able to marry whom. Because recognizing same-sex marriages would
promote both individual and state interests and because same-sex unions are both
intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, theorists who value marital love and
161. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L REV. 828, 894 (1999) ("Whether the
legislature can constitutionally make fornication a crime is uncertain."); id. at 894 n.342 (suggesting that it seems
likely that the Constitution does not protect fornication).
162. See Strasser, supra note 138, at 335.
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commitment or who value the provision of settings where children might thrive
should champion rather than undercut the right of same-sex couples to marry.
